U.S. Agricultural Export Credits after the WTO Cotton Ruling: The Law of Unintended Consequences by Benitah, Marc
Volume 6 Number 2 2005/p.107-114  esteyjournal.com 
Editorial Office: 410 22
nd St. E., Suite 820, Saskatoon, SK, Canada, S7K 5T6. 
Phone (306) 244-4800; Fax (306) 244-7839; email: kerr.w@esteycentre.com  107 
 
 
U.S. Agricultural Export Credits after 
the WTO Cotton Ruling:  
The Law of Unintended Consequences  
 
Marc Benitah 
Professor of International Law, University of Quebec
 1 
The recent WTO cotton ruling has led to a paradoxical result for the United States, a 
result that seems a textbook illustration of the “law of unintended consequences”. 
Indeed, during the Uruguay Round negotiations of the present WTO agreements, the 
United States refused to put agricultural export credits in the category of agricultural 
export subsidies, where they would then have been subject only to reduction 
commitments. Paradoxically, the United States finds itself now in a position where 
these same agricultural export credits that it did not condescend to reduce during the 
Uruguay Round are openly considered as prohibited export subsidies. This article 
analyses and criticizes the tortuous legal path followed by the cotton panel before 
arriving at such a radical conclusion.     
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ith regard to U.S. agricultural export credits,
2 the recent WTO cotton ruling
3 
has led to a paradoxical result for the United States, a result that seems a 
textbook illustration of the “law of unintended consequences”. This law, often cited 
but rarely defined, expresses the idea that actions of people – and especially of 
government – always have effects that are unanticipated or “unintended”. Economists 
and other social scientists have heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, 
politicians and popular opinion have largely ignored it.
4  
Indeed, during the Uruguay Round negotiations of the present WTO agreements, 
the United States refused to put agricultural export credits (which guarantee the 
commercial financing of U.S. agricultural commodities) in the category of agricultural 
export subsidies, which arise, for example, when a U.S. wheat producer receives an 
explicit payment for every ton of wheat exported.
5 If it had done so, the United States 
would have been obliged to reduce its agricultural export credits, by virtue of the 
reduction commitments of agricultural export subsidies included in Article 9.1 of the 
Agreement on Agriculture (AoA),
6 which is precisely entitled “Export Subsidy 
Commitments”; however, the United States would have been allowed in such a case to 
continue to grant the credits to a certain extent through the portion conforming to 
reduction commitments.
7 Paradoxically, the United States finds itself now in a 
position where these same agricultural export credits that it did not condescend to 
reduce during the Uruguay Round are openly considered as prohibited export 
subsidies. After a tortuous legal path, the WTO cotton panel (in a ruling upheld by the 
Appellate Body) has actually concluded that the United States export credit guarantee 
programs “constitute a per se export subsidy within the meaning of item (j) of the 
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies” of the SCM Agreement, “and these export credit 
guarantee programs are [thus prohibited] export subsidies for purposes of Article 
3.1(a) of the SCM Agreement ….”
8  
In spite of the numerous pages devoted by the Cotton Panel Report to the issue, it 
is possible to detect two decisive steps that made it possible for the panel to arrive at 
this conclusion. These two steps are so interconnected legally that their chronological 
order of appearance in the Cotton Panel Report is not to be taken too seriously, since 
it is likely that the panel had a good idea of how a given finding would thereafter fit in 
its global puzzle.  Note also from the outset that the first step was unsuccessfully 
appealed by the United States. However, surprisingly, the second step was not 
appealed by the United States, although it was potentially an Achilles heel of the 
panel’s reasoning. 
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Step one: Rejecting that the Agreement on Agriculture 
reflects the deferral of disciplines on agricultural 
export credits 
rticle 10.2 of the AoA seems to reflect at least implicitly that WTO members 
“agreed not to agree” on the issue of agricultural export credits and that they 
committed themselves only to negotiate future disciplines on this topic: 
Members undertake to work toward the development of internationally 
agreed disciplines to govern the provision of export credits … and, after 
agreement on such disciplines, to provide export credits … only in 
conformity therewith. 
The United States argued that the plain words of Article 10.2 indicate that export 
credit guarantee programs are not subject in any way to export subsidy disciplines 
included in the Agreement on Agriculture. As underlined in the introduction to this 
article, one of the strongest arguments advanced by the United States was that the 
panel’s interpretation leads to a result that is “manifestly absurd or unreasonable”. 
According to the United States, it “defies logic ... to take the view of the Panel in 
which [agricultural export credits] would be treated as ... [prohibited] export subsidies 
yet not … included within the applicable reduction commitments expressly 
contemplated by [Article 9.1 of the AoA]”.
9  
The panel, however, keeping in mind that it had previously found, with the help, 
as context, of item (j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies of the SCM 
Agreement,  that U.S. agricultural export credits were export subsidies for AoA 
purposes,
10 decided to place the bar very high before accepting the U.S. view.  
The panel reasoned that “in order to carve out or exempt particular categories of 
measures from general obligations [of the AoA], ... it would be reasonable to expect 
an explicit indication revealing such an intention in the text of the Agreement”.
11 In 
other words, the panel adopted the position that Article 10.2 of the AoA does not 
include express language suggesting that it is intended as an exception, nor does it 
expressly state that the application of any AoA export subsidy disciplines to export 
credits is “deferred” as the United States suggests. In the words of the Appellate Body, 
“Given that the drafters were aware that subsidized export credit(s) ... could fall 
within the export subsidy disciplines in the Agreement on Agriculture … it would be 
expected that an exception would have been clearly provided had this been the 
drafters’ intention”.
12  
In a rare dissenting opinion on this point, an anonymous member of the Appellate 
Body Division (which consists of three members) underlined that in Article 10.2 of 
the AoA, WTO members did exactly what the panel required, namely, carve out 
A   M. Benitah 
Estey Centre Journal of International Law and Trade Policy  110 
agricultural export credits and “spell out in Article 10.2 their commitments with 
respect to those ... areas”.
13 The anonymous member specified:  
I recognize that the language of this provision is not free from ambiguity. 
As noted by my colleagues on the Division, the drafters could have – dare 
I say, should have – made their intentions even more plain. If there were 
no Article 10.2, then I might concur with my colleagues .... However, 
Article 10.2 does exist and the meaning of the words as I read them is 
entirely prospective, at least with respect to the existence of applicable 
disciplines.
14 
Of course, had the panel found the existence of a deferral of disciplines through 
Article 10.2 of the AoA, the issue of agricultural export credits would have become 
virtually moot.  
Step two: Using the SCM Agreement both as context 
for the AoA and as a source for a radical prohibition 
obligation  
nce it had “settled” the issue of deferral of AoA disciplines, the panel confronted 
several obstacles before it could arrive at the radical conclusion that agricultural 
export credits were prohibited export subsidies under the SCM Agreement. It had to 
establish that, first, agricultural export credits were export subsidies for AoA purposes 
and, second, that they were not sheltered by the agricultural “peace clause” from an 
action under the SCM. The first obstacle was not negligible, since the AoA does not 
contain a general definition of an agricultural export subsidy and since, in the 
Appellate Body’s own words, “agricultural export credits do not necessarily constitute 
export subsidies for purposes of the Agreement on Agriculture”.
15 In other words, 
agricultural export credits are subject to the export subsidy disciplines in the AoA only 
to the extent that such measures include an export subsidy component under the form 
of a benefit not available in the free market for U.S. producers/exporters of, for 
example, wheat.
16 One could thus have expected long developments by the panel 
intended to demonstrate the “benefit” or “subsidy component” of U.S. agricultural 
export credits. However, as we shall see, this expectation would have been in vain. 
Even supposing the first obstacle were overcome, there remained the second 
obstacle in the form of the agricultural peace clause, since any application of Article 3 
of the SCM Agreement to U.S. agricultural credits was potentially hindered by the 
peace clause (Article 13/AoA). This clause provided during the implementation period 
(1995–2003) a shelter from action under the SCM Agreement to “fully conform”
17 
agricultural export subsidies.  
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The panel overcame simultaneously all these obstacles by using item (j) of the 
SCM in order to kill two birds with one stone. First, item (j) was used, as context, in 
order to interpret the meaning of the expression “export subsidies” in the AoA. On this 
basis, the panel concluded that U.S. agricultural export credits were export subsidies 
for AoA purposes,
18 since they were provided “at premium rates which are inadequate 
to cover the long-term operating costs and losses of the programmes”.
19 The panel 
then found that with respect to upland cotton and other products, the United States 
applies export credits constituting export subsidies in a manner that results in 
circumvention of its export subsidy commitments inconsistently with Article 10.1 of 
the AoA. Concretely, this meant they did not “fully conform” to Part V of the AoA and 
thus were not sheltered by the peace clause from actions under Article 3 of the SCM 
Agreement. Finally, the panel added that it saw no “reason ... why this [contextual] 
analysis may not also be applied directly in an examination of the merits of Brazil's 
claims ... under the SCM Agreement”.
20 All the necessary elements were then met for 
concluding that 
To the extent that the United States export credit guarantee programmes .... 
do not conform fully to ... Part V of the Agreement on Agriculture and do 
not benefit from the exemption from actions provided by [the peace 
clause] ..., they are also export subsidies prohibited by Article 3.1(a)/SCM 
(emphasis added).
21 
Why did the panel, before using item (j), not place the 
bar as high as it did in its interpretation of Article 10.2 
of the AoA? 
n spite of all possible policy arguments against agricultural export credits and their 
possible distortional trade effects, the fact is that the legal reasoning of the cotton 
panel (upheld by the Appellate Body) on this issue is not totally convincing. The 
problem stems partly from using item (j) of the SCM Illustrative List both as context 
for interpreting the meaning of the expression “export subsidy” in the AoA and as a 
direct source of a radical prohibition obligation (under Article 3 of the SCM, which 
itself refers to the Illustrative List). There is nothing wrong with using the SCM 
Agreement as context for interpreting certain terms not defined in the Agreement on 
Agriculture. This has been done several times by previous panels.
22 In this case, 
however, the contextual analysis was transformed into a substantive analysis leading 
to a radical conclusion, without the panel taking the time (it saw “no reason”) to 
reflect on the legitimacy of its approach. The panel underlined of course that Article 
21 of the AoA indicates that the SCM applies to agricultural subsidies, but Article 21 
indicates also that this application is “subject to the provisions [of the AoA]” which 
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contains, as we saw, also Article 10.2 relating to a potential deferral of agricultural 
export credits disciplines. One could thus ask why in such a controversial and 
uncertain legal issue, the panel did not place the bar as high for itself as it did while 
interpreting Article 10.2 of the AoA. In other words, why did the panel not seek to 
find in item (j) of the SCM Illustrative List “an explicit indication revealing ... an 
intention” that item (j) applies to agricultural export credits? It is useful to note here 
that such an explicit indication would have been most welcome, since the legislative 
history of the Uruguay Round indicates that, at one point in the negotiations, there 
was a proposal for applying the SCM Illustrative List of Export Subsidies to 
agricultural products. This proposal was dropped in the Draft Final Act in favor of an 
“undertak[ing] not to provide export credits otherwise than in conformity with 
internationally agreed disciplines”, which in turn was replaced by the current version 
of Article 10.2 of the AoA.
23 Of course, if the panel had sought to find such an explicit 
intention in item (j), it would not have found it.  
Recently, in response to the WTO ruling, the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
announced a modification of the three export credit guarantee programs administered 
by USDA’s Commodity Credit Corp. (CCC), namely the Export Credit Guarantee 
Program (GSM-102), the Intermediate Export Credit Guarantee Program (GSM-103), 
and the Supplier Credit Guarantee Program (SCGP).
24 Effective July 2005, the CCC 
will use a risk-based fee structure for the GSM-102 and SCGP programs. The idea is 
that that fee rates will be based on the country risk that CCC is undertaking, as well as 
the repayment term (tenor) and repayment frequency (annual or semi-annual) under 
the guarantee. Also as of July 1, the CCC will no longer accept applications for 
payment guarantees under GSM-103. Any remaining country and regional allocations 
for GSM-103 coverage under fiscal year 2005 program announcements will be 
reallocated to the existing GSM-102 program for that country or region.  
Although these compliance measures seem to be accepted by Brazil, at least for 
the agricultural export credits portion of the cotton ruling, it remains to be seen if 
these measures will be enough in the context of the Doha Round negotiations. Recall 
that the European Union is insisting in this round on new disciplines for agricultural 
export credits as a condition for it agreeing to the eventual elimination of agricultural 
export subsidies. The European Union is the biggest spender on agricultural export 
subsidies, while the United States is the biggest user of agricultural export credits. 
Would the European Union find these compliance measures to be enough to satisfy its 
demand for new agricultural export credits disciplines, now that there is a WTO ruling 
declaring that these export credits are prohibited subsidies under the SCM agreement? 
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